

# Biden has abandoned democracy

The US nation is drifting away from the rule of law. But there is hope: Donald Trump might come back to the Presidency.

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## Summary and introduction.

Here I show, using signaling games and standard assumptions about political behavior, that the Biden camp is playing a de facto game against the republican people and the democrats who suspect fraud. I infer, given the publicly evident bias against Trump of the MSM and the behavior of private institutions like Dominion and what we know in Economics about corruption and rent-seeking behavior, that the de facto game is also against all the people of the United States and their democratic republic. The argument is simple. In order to show that the elections are not rigged, the Biden camp needs to show a transparency signal for them. But he is not showing it. Instead, he is playing the strategy of obstruction of political justice regarding investigations into the possible fraud in the 2020 presidential elections. In addition, there is public evidence that important elements in the Biden camp are attacking their enemies using harassment tactics, like the demand for defamation initiated by Dominion against Sidney Powell and Mike Lindell. Even though the paper is technical (at the level of a Masters degree in Economics of Business Administration at a good School), I try to make it understandable to the common people, explaining the details that experts in Game Theory would not need, as we go along.

I first set up a basic standard signaling games model for the aftermath of the presidential elections of 2020. The usual behavior of a corrupt politician is to mimic, like chameleons, honest politicians regarding the election results. For that, they send the signal of being transparent, like the honest politicians prefer to act regarding the electors. In this basic model, an honest politician is not able to differentiate himself from the corrupt one.

But it turns out that showing transparency is too costly to the Biden camp: it would imply that the election results are reversed, and Trump would be proclaimed to be the legitimate president. A second, more realistic model, which explains why the Biden camp has not been transparent with the people, pinpoints the main element present here: the differentiating issue is the cost involved. For Trump it is easy to be transparent. For Biden it is prohibitive.

The public behavior of the Biden camp implies that they not only don't try to be chameleons to fool the republican population: they adamantly show a hindrance behavior against the attempts of the Trump camp to do revisions of the electoral data; to do independent investigations into the results. And not only that: it is intimidating and canceling people, in particular Sidney Powell Michael Lindell and Maricopa County, trying to discourage people from doing what they are doing regarding their investigations on the fraud. I show that the judiciary and electoral systems are failing the people, and that the country is entering a de facto game, drifting away in a perilous path from democracy.

We then set up a model of de facto confrontation, the Hawk vs Chicken game, and show that what matters here is not absolute force, but relative one. We show why the Biden camp won the presidency, but pinpoint the fact that not only material forces, like the media and technology power, matter in the aftermath confrontation. Morals are crucial in this war. In that sense, the original values of the Judeo-Christian civilization will be a critical factor, and we notice a revival in that sense that will make the difference.

If it is true what I claim here, the US would be falling sick of rentism, a new, deadly variety of the Venezuelan virus, the curse of abundance defined in the companion essay, "Conspiracy and Fraud in the US: What is next?"

[https://www.quehacer.wiki/wiki/V2\\_Conspiracy\\_and\\_fraud\\_in\\_the\\_US\\_elections](https://www.quehacer.wiki/wiki/V2_Conspiracy_and_fraud_in_the_US_elections)

Rentism brings about disaster and the reason has to do with the huge inefficiencies that come from the mechanisms of market and democracy failing and not working for consumers and citizens, respectively, but for the corporations and rent seekers, respectively. In fact, rentism has three sources of inefficiency.

One comes from the market power of the rent-seekers who capture the public institutions. It is well known in basic economics that monopolies extract rent from the

consumers and employ less workers than a competitive market. The other comes from dictatorial (a political oligarchy in a collusion) dominion of the rent seekers over the people. It is well known the political inefficiencies that come in a society from the lack of competition in the political arena: the dictator extracts rent from the taxes of people and designs and implements programs that are not optimal compared to the ones that come from a democratic elected government. The third comes from the composition of the two previous ones: political and economic concentration of power causes great damage to a society, and the citizens (both consumers and electors) pay a high price in all aspects of life: economic, political and social. Also in terms of the deterioration of the environment in those areas and in the natural areas (pollution, depletion of natural resources, etc).

We can clearly see that in the Venezuelan case, where a very rich country in natural resources has been brought to a complete economic, social and political disaster. A failed society in which the powerful also do illegal business like drugs, arms trafficking and terrorism, and is a base to extend the war against democracy in the world. If my arguments are true, the US would be now the new base.

## The basic standard model.

To begin with, let's assume a basic symmetric setup for Biden and Trump, to show that what Biden is playing is not coherent with political rationality in a democracy. It is important to distinguish between the pre-electoral scenarios, and the post-electoral ones. The election already occurred. The issue here is whether there was fraud enough so that the proclamation of Joe Biden as the President is legitimate or not. And we assume, as a first approach, that the Biden camp can be summarized in his person. The same for Trump.

With that in mind, we look for the main relevant variables and the relevant players in a democracy, to see if it works or not, and to evaluate if the institutions in charge (the electoral system, the justice system) support it: the politicians involved in the affair, Joe Biden and Donald Trump, and the US citizens who voted. Notice something crucial: there is factual asymmetric information between both politicians, and the people. The first ones know more about what happens to them and what decisions they make in private, away from the eyes of the public. The issue at hand is if they reveal that information to the public or not. If they reveal the truth or not. In particular, the

politician committing fraud knows about it if he did. If Biden, for example, committed fraud, he knows it. If he did not, he knows it.

Even though the main political trial has to do with Joe Biden, a trial for Donald Trump is complementary, and helps to confirm the verdict of the political trial we propose the people perform.

Our reality, as described, fits perfectly for a signaling game, and its predictions and insights shed a lot of light on the sorts of issues at hand. Such a signaling game occurs when there is a sender of a message, and the receiver. The sender knows more about his "type" than the receiver. In our simplified but meaningful enough reality, the types are two possible ones, then: honest or corrupt. And only they know what type they are, not the citizens. The citizens can only judge them indirectly, through their messages. They try, to the best of their abilities, and being rational and consistent, judge by the messages the politicians send. They take them as "signals" of what they really are: if honest or corrupt. That is why, in science and in business administration, we judge by performance. By their works you will know them, as Jesus said, and that is the base of the scientific and administration methods to judge public officials (and private ones too).

So, the relevant signals are of two kinds: either transparent or obstructionist to the investigation regarding electoral fraud. As we can see, those messages, or signals, are the relevant and also the key ones to our case of study.

It is clear that there is an important correlation between being honest and being transparent. And between being corrupt and to obstruct investigations regarding the possible fraud. But, as we will show, sometimes the corrupt politicians send the same message of an honest one, in this case of transparency, in order to camouflage themselves as honest, and fool the people. In those cases, given the information the people are able to gather, they don't get to distinguish between the two, and get fooled in real life. But we identify the precise conditions in which it is possible, and it occurs. And also the ones in which it is possible for people to separate weed from wheat. The separating case is the ideal one for the people, and for science and business administration. But it comes at a cost both for the sender and for the receiver, as we will see.

So, for the payoffs of the players in the game, we assume the simplest and logical preferences, not judging a priori in favor or against Biden nor Trump: we are not

allowed to assume what we want to prove. So, an honest politician, for example, prefers to be transparent. The reason is that he does not gain anything from hiding his intentions and performance. On the contrary: he gains when people know about it. Not only because he becomes popular (given that he is an efficient public servant, which we assume for simplicity and it is natural), but because he loves to serve the people: his interest is to benefit them. On the other hand, a corrupt one prefers to be opaque; he has a lot to hide, for the opposite reasons as the honest one: he is selfish, and uses the people's interest to serve himself in office. In particular, incurs in opacity, or hindrance, regarding his true type: he does not want people to know he is corrupt, since then he is not elected.


Regarding the preferences of the people, in general they like to have an honest elected politician in office and hate a corrupt one. Now, in a more sophisticated model, which includes rentism, many people are influenced by the rent seeking mafia cartel in order to vote for their puppet, as long as it offers them rentistic crumbs. That is the case of rentistic populism, one of the symptoms of rentism. Here we address the basic model in which most of the people represent their own preferences (and not those of their enemies) when choosing to trust, believe or vote for him.

In this model, let us assume then that the structure and the culture of the country is a given. In a normal democracy, the probability of society having honest politicians is bigger than of having corrupt ones. In a country with rentism the opposite happens and, in fact, almost all politicians are corrupt.

In our basic game, let us assume we are in between those two systems, and that is why we proposed that the probability of getting a corrupt politician is  $\frac{1}{3}$ , and of getting an honest one is  $\frac{2}{3}$ .

With that in mind, the game can be represented as this:

## Basic signaling game



Nature is the first player, and chooses the type of the politician in question; the one we want to judge, Biden or Trump. Even though we know that generally, professional politicians, like Joe Biden, tend to be more corrupt than independent citizens borrowed to politics, like Donald Trump, in an election for public office, we assume, to strengthen our results, that nature chooses the type of the politician in our cases, both for Biden and Trump, with equal probability for the two of the. So, in our example below, Biden is honest with a probability of  $\frac{2}{3}$ . Corrupt with a probability of  $\frac{1}{3}$ . The same for Trump.

After nature chooses the type, the turn to play is for politicians. In our simple game, the politicians, regardless of their type, choose either to be transparent, or to use hindrance regarding their actions, in particular in relation to the electoral results, which is the topic we study here. Now, they have private information about their type: honest or corrupt, but the people do not know what their type is, and can only hope to make inferences based on their performance: their signals. So, when they observe the signal "Transparency", they do not know, a priori, where that signal comes from. It can be an honest politician, but it can also be a corrupt one. The same in the case of the signal

“Hindrance”. That is why we connect in the graph the two types of player given each signal. For Transparency, we use the blue line, while for Hindrance we use the red line.

Based on the information they are able to observe, the people choose to trust or not to trust the politician they face. Then, after the people choose, the payoffs occur. The first number in the vector of payoffs, expressed as a couple of numbers within parentheses separated by a comma, is the net payoff for the player who moves first with his message or signal, the politician in question. The second number is the net gain for the people, the second player, who moves to trust or not to trust the politician sending the message.

The numbers I use reflect more qualitative characteristics of the players, and their relative relationships, than actual quantities. Reflecting on the kind of reasons we explained above, if the politician is honest, and the people decide to trust him, he earns 3 if he decides to be transparent with the people, and only 2 if he places hindrances to the electoral investigation. Again, the reason is because, given his nature, he feels better when the people benefit from his actions. The opposite happens for a corrupt politician if he is trusted by the people. He earns only 2 if he is transparent, and 3 if he puts obstacles to the electoral investigation. His nature makes him pursue his selfish motives, which are opposite to the ones of the people. If what he did in this regard is revealed, he is going to suffer a loss, now and in the future due to his lack of good reputation. Otherwise, he will be happy.

Now, if the politicians are not trusted by the people, they earn less, but, depending on his character, he earns 1 if he chooses to be transparent and is honest, and 0 if is not. On the contrary, if the politician is corrupt, he earns 0 if transparent, and 1 if he places hindrances to being investigated. The reasons are similar: the honest politician enjoys being transparent, and earns 1 even if not trusted. The corrupt one earns 0 if not trusted and he is transparent, but 1 if he is opaque.

Regarding the preferences and payments of the people, if they turn out to face an honest politician, they end up being happy, so that they earn 3 regardless of the politician being transparent or not (since the result is the same, anyway). If they do not trust him, they end up in a comparatively worse situation, and earn zero.

If they end up facing a politician and decide to trust them, they lose 1 if the politician is transparent, and 2 if he is opaque. The loss is bigger if there is no transparency. On the

other hand, the people would end up better off if they do not trust the corrupt guy. So they earn a positive net gain of 1 in either case. Notice the difference with the case of an honest politician in the case of not trusting him. Not trusting an honest politician gives no gain, while not trusting a corrupt one produces a gain of 1.

## Equilibria for signaling games.

In general, there are two possible equilibria. One is a “separating equilibria”, in which people are able to infer the real type of politician they face, given their signal. It is what we want in business administration and politics, for example, to be able to make inferences about unobserved variables (inability to do a job, corruption) by looking at observable variables (work performance, transparency). For obvious reasons, then, the first kind of equilibria is called separating equilibria, while the second one is called “pooling equilibria”. In the first one, the good types are able to distinguish themselves in the market, while in the second one, the bad types are able to fool the consumers.

In order to make the corresponding predictions, we need a sensible definition of equilibria. It is based on the concept of Nash Equilibria in Game Theory, where it is required at the strategy profile (the vector of strategies played, one for each player in the game) that each player plays the best alternative given what the other players are supposed to play. Since we have a dynamic game (played here in two stages), we need that at each period the players make sensible decisions, based on their best interests, following the Nash concept requirement. Since in the second stage there is some uncertainty, the player there, the people, have to do some probabilistic considerations about the player who is sending the observed signal in order to make a decision. Given those probable decisions, the first player takes them into account in order to make the best decision for them. If a set of strategies meet those loosely stated criteria, we have a “Bayesian Perfect Nash Equilibrium”. The concept of perfection comes from dynamic games of symmetric information, where at each stage you have to have a Nash equilibrium, and the equilibrium for the whole game is then called “Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium”. In the Appendix I explain more rigorously how to define a Bayesian Perfect Nash Equilibrium.

## Chameleon equilibrium in the basic game



With this definition in place, which makes intuitive sense, let us then examine the plausibility of a pooling equilibrium, in which not only the honest politician plays transparency, but also the corrupt one does too. For that, remember that we are talking about only one politician here. Imagine that we are talking of Biden or Trump, whoever you prefer.

We have that for our first example, the basic model, there is only one possible equilibrium, where people can be fooled with these kind of standard payoffs, as we will show, and we then have the phenomenon of chameleon behavior of a corrupt politician: he poses as an honest one by giving a transparency signal, and is able to fool the people doing that. As we will show, a separating equilibrium is not possible in this basic model, and will show why: the issue of costs of separating signaling not being high enough.

In order to examine if this pooling equilibrium is possible here, assume, then, that both types play Transparency. Since by their face alone they do not know what their type is, the people assign the same original probability (the one chosen by the player Nature) of being honest or corrupt:  $\frac{1}{3}$  for the first, and  $\frac{2}{3}$  for the second. If the people choose to trust him given the supposed observed transparency attitude, it has an expected gain of  $\frac{2}{3}(3) + \frac{1}{3}(-1) = 1\frac{2}{3}$ . If they choose not to trust him, they get an expected gain of  $\frac{2}{3}(0) + \frac{1}{3}(-1) = -\frac{1}{3}$ . So, in this contingency, it is best to trust the politician.

Even though playing hindrance is not observed in this proposed case, our Nash equilibrium concept naturally requires us to have a “complete” strategy, as we will see in the Appendix. It is like having a complete contingent plan, which prescribes what to do for each unforeseen possible event. This is intuitively justified because that way the contender player knows what he would do in each event, and that way reacts optimally. Assume, then, for that purpose, that the people, having observed hindrance in the politician, infer that he is either honest or corrupt with subjective probabilities of  $q$  and  $(1-q)$ . If the people choose to trust him, their expected gain is  $q(3) + (1-q)(-1) = 4q - 1$ . If they choose not to trust him, their expected payoff would be  $q(0) + (1-q)(1) = 1-q$ . So that they will choose to trust him in this case only if  $4q - 1 \geq 1 - q$ . In other words, only if  $q \geq \frac{2}{5}$ . If  $q \leq \frac{2}{5}$  they will not trust him.

To construct the pooling equilibrium, assume that  $q \leq \frac{2}{5}$ , which means that the probability that the politician is honest given that he plays hindrance is low; in other words, the probability of the politician playing hindrance if he is corrupt is high.

Given the stated contingent strategy by the people, we can see examining the corresponding payoffs in this basic model, that an honest politician would get 3 if he chooses transparency and zero if he chooses hindrance. On the other hand, a corrupt politician would get 2 if he chooses transparency, and only 1 if hindrance.

In conclusion, the strategy profile [(Transparency, Transparency), (Trust, Don't Trust); q] is a Bayesian Perfect Nash Equilibrium for  $q \leq \frac{2}{5}$ . Which is what we want to prove: a chameleon equilibrium exists, and the corrupt politician is able to fool the people playing the same strategy that an honest one would play, signaling transparency.

## A separating equilibrium is not possible in this basic game

Now we will show that a separating equilibrium is not possible in this game. Such equilibrium requires the strategy profile of (Transparency, Hindrance) by the first player, the politician. It is clear, having that strategy as a given, that the subjective probabilities of the receiver of the signal, the people, would be  $r = 1$  (if the people observe Transparency in the behavior of the politician, it is sure he is of the honest type) and  $q = 0$  (if the people observe Hindrance in the behavior of the politician, it is sure he is not of the honest type; he is of the corrupt type for sure).

Facing this strategy of the opponent player, and having those beliefs, the payoffs of the receiver player, the people, are: if it observes Transparency (and then it believes honesty), trusting gives it 3, and not trusting 0. The best response is then to trust the politician at hand.

Upon observing hindrance, and believing corruption, trusting would procure -2 for the people, and not trusting 1. The best response is then not to trust the politician at hand.

Now let us see if the proposed strategy by the politician, a separating one, makes sense given those best responses by the people. If an honest politician chooses Transparency, he would get 3 (since people would then trust, as we saw). If Hindrance, he would get 0 (in this case the people would not trust, thinking he is corrupt). In the case of a corrupt one, if he chooses transparency, we would get 2 (since the people would think he is honest, and then would trust him). If he chooses Hindrance, he would

get only 1. So, to choose Hindrance is not a best response, and a separating equilibrium is not possible in this game.

## How we make a separating equilibrium possible

It is worthwhile to make a reminder again to the reader that this game is for any of our proposed politicians, Biden and Trump. As a way of introduction to this section, our conclusion for the basic model is that if any of them is corrupt, he would not play a strategy that would reveal his type. Both of them would play Transparency. The honest one would do that in order to enjoy the consequences of being trusted by the people, and doing a good job for them. The corrupt one would do that, on the other hand, in order to enjoy the consequences of fooling people, even though he is not as well off as the honest one, since his objective is not to please the people, but to get his selfish interests while in office.

But does this mean that for the purpose of judging the election results, it is not possible for the people to differentiate good from wrong regarding corruption and fraud in the US presidential elections?


The answer is no, as we will see: a separating equilibrium is possible, and it makes sense both in theory and in practice for our case in these circumstances, the US. The theory, to be acceptable, has to be able to explain reality, and it is a fact that, for knowledgeable people beyond the fray of mediatic controversy, like academicians not compromised with financing by one of the contenders, spiritually oriented people, independent voters interested in keeping democracy, etc, it is a fact that Joe Biden and his camp are not playing Transparency, given what they have done regarding the forensic audits, and the side they have chosen in court. On this last matter, in the companion paper I show, using Agency Theory, that, paradoxically to many people, the Biden camp should be the one assuming the burden of proof and proving their innocence, but are doing just the contrary: requiring the Trump camp the burden of proof of fraud, and putting obstacles into investigations regarding that. But if someone does not admit that public evidence, it is so from the point of view of the vast majority of republican people, and a sizable part of the democratic people: it is not an issue this time of accepting an electoral verdict that they do not like; it is an issue of seriously not believing the result.

With this motivation that comes from public and verifiable evidence (at least for the republican people, as I said), which contradicts the previous only possible equilibrium, we then now set up a modified game to show that differentiating right from wrong is possible, and point to the key element of theory, which reflects reality: the issues of costs of differentiation for the politicians. If the cost of behaving as a chameleon is too big for the corrupt politician, the honest one takes advantage of that, and is able to show who he is, and, at the same time, show that he is not the same as the corrupt one: he is able to show indirectly to the people who the corrupt politician is. In our case the separating equilibrium is acceptable to knowledgeable people and, for people contending this result, at least to most republicans, and some democrats.

To get the flavor of the result let us observe an everyday life example of a separating equilibrium, and why it is so convenient for society. This will give us a sense of how odd it is for the political world to negate it and its necessity. This negation, or “cancellation” points to a very troublesome symptom of rentism in the US. The example comes from the top schools in Economics. Notice that for a not well educated and smart person, it is basically impossible to succeed getting a PhD from The University of Chicago. It is too costly in terms of his intellectual capability. It would imply studying day and night all the time (assuming that he gets financing, and assuming he is able to get acceptance to the program when he applied). The case of The University of Chicago is an especially good example because the admission is somewhat more lax than universities of similar level like MIT, Harvard and Princeton, but the filters to graduate are much harder, as it is known in that environment. Similarly, then, it is relatively easy for a corrupt politician to enter politics, but if the system has rigorous controls, it is able to detect and filter out them, to the benefit of the people and of democracy. If not, democracy is simply not working, since it does not have the mechanisms that allow the people to differentiate a good candidate from a bad one. Even worse: it does not have the ability to know if the elections reflect their will or not.

For that, let us modify the payoffs of the game, reflecting the usual reality motivated in our paragraph. They are at the next figure:

## High cost of being transparent



As we said, a separating equilibrium requires the strategy profile of (Transparency, Hindrance) by the politician. Again the subjective probabilities of the receiver of the signal, the people, would be  $r = 1$  (if the people observe Transparency in the behavior of the politician, it is sure he is of the honest type) and  $q = 0$  (if the people observe Transparency in the behavior of the politician, it is sure he is not of the honest type; he is of the corrupt type for sure).

Facing this strategy the payoffs of the people are: if it observes Transparency (and then it believes honesty), trusting gives it 3, and not trusting 0. The best response is to trust the politician.

Upon observing Hindrance, and believing corruption, trusting would procure -2 for the people, and not trusting 1. The best response is not to trust the sender of the message.

Now let us see if the proposed strategy by the politicians makes sense in this new setup tanking those responses as given in the explored equilibrium. If an honest politician chooses Transparency, he would get 3 (since people would then trust, as we saw). If Hindrance, he would get 0 (in this case the people would not trust, thinking he is corrupt). In the case of a corrupt one, if he chooses transparency, we would get  $\frac{1}{2}$  (since the people would think he is honest, and then would trust him). If he chooses Hindrance, he would get 1. So, to choose Hindrance is a best response since 1 is greater than  $\frac{1}{2}$ , and the separating equilibrium is possible this time.

In summary, [(Transparency, Hindrance),(Trust,Don't Trust);r;q] is a Bayesian Perfect Nash Equilibrium for  $r = 1$ ;  $q = 0$ . Which is what we hoped to prove: a separating equilibrium exists, and the honest politician is able to reveal his type to the people while the corrupt one is not able to fool them, since it is too costly for him to do so. Only the honest politician has the capability to send what is called the "costly signal". It is here that we can see that the advice of Jesus that says "by their works you will know them", makes sense. And we then are able to perform scientific and administrative methods to judge public officials and private business. To recall our main private business example, to get a PhD in Economics at The University of Chicago is too costly for a non prepared student. Only capable students can get that degree. As we can guess, it is the normal procedure used in business administration and consumer markets every day and everywhere. That way, for example, private and public organizations can tell who is the best applicant for an opening job. It should be the same method used in politics, but we are witnessing a pernicious change in the US as a consequence of rentism. In Venezuela, that capability is long gone, due to the curse of abundance, the virus that contaminated the US.

From all this we understand better the idea that a democratic structure, as a system with proper institutions (the electoral apparatus, the judiciary), should make it very costly for a politician to be corrupt. If not, it is failing to make it a dynamically stable political system, as we will see again, and falls into rentism, which is indeed a stable one in the sense that it is an attractor: if you get close to it, as in this case with the Presidency of the republic, you converge to it, and all the public institutions get contaminated and there is no rule of law, but rule of the strongest, a mafia cartel of rent seekers.

## Trump, Lindell, Powell, Dominion.

The Trump camp has been completely willing to be transparent regarding what they know about the elections. Not only for republicans, but for democrats too. In the companion paper on Conspiracy and Fraud in the US, I show that it is the responsibility of Biden, not Trump, to be transparent regarding the election results. In this game we confirm that idea too: if he wants to clear his name, if only for fooling the people, he has to play transparency. In other words, Biden can not expect that Trump demonstrates, directly or indirectly, to absolve him of suspicion. Even if Trump turns out to be corrupt, Biden can not be cleared if he does not do the job himself. The cases are different, and this highlights that there is a very personal and direct responsibility on the public actions of a politician. He can not evade it, even if all the others are corrupt.

We can evaluate private citizens who are not politicians too (only if they deserve praise, since defamation of them without proof is a crime), but are playing a political role in favor of the people, looking for transparency, like Mike Lindell and Sidney Powell, for example. They have been accused by the MSM, and even in court by Dominion, as liars.

This game shows us that they have been willing to show their claims. It is to note that Michael Lindell offered \$5 million to anyone to prove him wrong in his claims of external interference, using the Internet, to rig the elections. Nobody has been able to do it and claim the money. That is a costly signal. They, then, have played the transparency strategy again and again. While Dominion, an accuser in court, has not been willing to play that strategy, but the Hindrance one. And have gone to extremes of intimidating private citizens like them with multi billion dollars court cases against them. What is surprising is that Mr Lindell and Ms Powell have been willing to face those courts. Showing a costly signal, which their enemies have not been able to show: they are willing to lose all their fortunes, personal and professional prestige, in order to play the transparency strategy.

## De facto game and Biden's temporary win.

There is a player, not considered in our models, that is able to fool some people into thinking that a politician is playing transparency when he in fact is playing hindrance. The media. As we argue in the companion essay "Conspiracy and Fraud in the US Elections", the new gen war we are in has the main battlefield in the communications arena, and fake news is the main weapon of the bad type of player in that fight. The MSM has tried to convince the people that Biden has played transparency, and has

some people to testify in that sense, like former DOJ, Mr. William Barr. People like James O’Keefe have been able, within Project Veritas, that the MSM and Big Tech corporations like Facebook and Twitter, have lied to influence people in that regard. But let us assume that they have been able to convince those people that Biden has played transparency in this game. Even in this case, most republicans, as I myself too, believe the Biden camp is playing hindrance. In particular regarding the evidence of Mike Lindell and Maricopa County.

After we wrote the first draft, the Maricopa Audit revealed blatant and criminal activity carried by the electoral officials for the erasing electoral files, connection to the internet, refusal to be transparent, and so on, which signals the people not to trust the actual votes, which were not audited for correct identities, signatures, paper, etc. In the “Conspiracy and Fraud in the US Elections” paper I show that one of the key symptoms of rentism is that authority or ideology does not matter anymore. The rent seekers capture opposition politicians, judges and other public officials. It is a de facto game, not a de jure or ideological one. That means that the fact that a republican politician, or a public official, like Barr, says that the election results are correct, is not sufficient to convince people in favor of that, which also motivates this section.

It is also undeniable that there is a strong division in the US regarding the election results. Now, the fact that the Biden camp doesn’t care about what most republicans think about this, because it is a fact that he has played hindrance for them, and then do not trust him, trusting Trump and his people instead, points to a de facto, not de jure, or democratic, game against them, at least.

In this section I postulate a simplified de facto game for the whole war, focusing on the fields not yet conquered by the Biden camp: the people who do not believe Biden is playing transparency. The exercise will allow us to see what is the best strategy for those republicans and democrats not believing in the election returns, and a possible prediction.

The game of Hawk and Chicken.

		Biden	
		Hawk	Chicken



Trump	Hawk	$x ; y$	10 ; 0
	Chicken	0 ; 10	5 ; 5

In order to better understand this game, it is useful to imagine two cars which are in the course of a collision. At the last minute, the drivers have the opportunity to continue ahead, or to deviate from the collision course. The first alternative is called the hawk, or courage, strategy, while the second one is called chicken or concede strategy. The first number in the payoff matrix corresponds to the row player (Trump), while the second to the column player (Biden). If the Biden camp plays hawk for example, and the Trump camp play concede, Biden would gain all the territory, 10, while Trump would get nothing, 0. It is as if Biden keeps in the collision course and plays courage to hit Trump's car, but Trump chickens out and deviates from the collision course. As a result, Biden ends up with both cars, which is the bet of the game. Similarly for Trump if he plays courage and Biden chickens out.

The prediction of the game, the Nash Equilibrium, depends crucially on the numbers  $x$  and  $y$ , which are the payoffs of the players if there is actual collision in the game. For example, if Biden has a bigger car, a Hummer, say, and Trump a Beetle, if they crash, the Beetle gets a lot of damage, and the Hummer ends up only with some bruises. In that case,  $x = -1$ , say, and  $Y = 1$ .

If this is the case, it is not optimal, then, for Trump, to play courage, since, if Biden plays Hawk, he earns -1, while if he plays Chicken, he gets 0. The only Nash equilibrium with those values for  $x$  and  $y$  is (concede, courage), and the lower and left corner of the payoffs are earned: Trump deviates his car and does not fight, since he drives a Beetle, and Biden fights since he drives a Hummer. Biden takes all the territory, 10, and Trump gets nothing, 0.

This game is useful not only to analyze the fight for electoral results at this moment, which is the reality we are focusing on now. If it is true that the Biden camp is playing a de facto game not only against the republican people, but against all US citizens, we can also divide reality for basic analytical purposes between the Presidency and the

whole nation. He already won the game of the dispute of the Presidency using a de facto confrontation, playing the Hawk strategy. Trump was defeated, since his camp had less strength, in particular in the MSM and the electoral system.

The two games we can analyze now, whose outcome has not occurred yet, are the fight between the Biden camp and the Trump camp for the revision of the electoral results, on the one hand, and the game to dispute for the whole nation as the prize, not only for the Presidency. From this point of view, the win by Biden of the presidency is viewed only as temporary by the Trump camp; it is subject to change given the current fight for the electoral results, and the concede strategy can be viewed then as a temporary concession, a tactical cohabitation in a dynamic game, not as the static one of the Hawk and Chicken one. In the companion paper I argue that the de facto game for the nation is to be expected from the illness of Rentism: the rent seekers to not stop when they capture the executive branch of the national government; they want to control Congress at the national and regional levels, the Judiciary, the governorships and the mayors. They never want to come back to democracy, where the rule of law holds.

The battle for the electoral result is crucial regarding the war for the whole nation. For the whole world too, by the way, as I argue in the referred companion paper, since the mafia cartel of rent-seekers would not stop at capturing the US as a nation: it wants the whole world.

Let us focus on this game, then, and take a quick look at the relative forces of the contenders for the electoral results. As we said, what determines the result of the game, the prediction (the Nash Equilibrium) is the relative force, and at least in appearance, Biden has more factual force than Trump. He has most of the MSM, the National Congress, many governors and mayors, and military command. I would also say, the electoral system. And a lot of Money from the private corporations, including MSM, Financial, Big Pharma, Big Tech, Big war industry, China and Iran. Now, the Trump camp also has congressmen, governors, mayors, judges, the SCOTUS, and many military personnel and private money. Also an increasing number of alternative media and social media, in a sort of underground insurrection in that field.

Grossly speaking, from that point of view,  $x < 0 < y$  and Biden wins again in the electoral investigation battle, keeping the presidency, and continuing the fight to get the whole nation (and the whole world, since Biden is a puppet of the big world-wild rent seekers).

# The moral component: Trump might get back to the Presidency.

But there is a key element that weighs in this kind of war: morals, the truth and spiritual strength. It affects the preferences of the players expressed in the payoff matrix, where the relative force in the confrontational scenario determines the result, as we have seen. We know from the kamikaze and personal bombs examples of the Japanese and Muslim fighters, respectively, that combat morals is, again, a crucial element in a de facto game, like the one we face, in this new gen kin of war where actual gunfire is not the main weapon. We know, then, that in some past wars where gunfire power is supposed to determine the result, that apparently inferior material forces in one of the sides have not explained the result of their success in the final result. We claim that the same happens in this new gen kind of war.

In this regard, then, even if moral motivations are a crucial element in wars, it is useful to compare different moral motivations, since in the present war there are, besides money motivations, communist and Muslim motivations. Very importantly, this has been a war of aggression against the US nation, using an important part of their own people, most of them unknowingly, in favor of their enemies. Here China, Iran, and the big corporations mentioned are involved. Political and geopolitical motivations, monetary gain, an communist an Islamic motivations are involved. communist motivations of the Chinese type come from a materialistic base, following a presumed right of the workers. In practice it pursues the rights of the powerful in the communist party, in its nation and abroad, as we have seen in practice, and more and more Chinese people have rebelled against. In the Muslim case, for example, the fighters rely on the faith for a better life in heaven. Monetary and geopolitical motivations do not give much moral basis of the kind we are talking about, since those were included in the previous section.

Regarding Christians motivations, on the other hand, they have shown a superior level of disposition for sacrifice and martyrdom throughout history for defense purposes, using mostly pacific and lawful methods, and only physical force in some circumstances, as a way self-defense, like in the case of the crusades against the Muslim invasion of Europe and Palestine in the middle ages. Early on they were able to capture the Roman empire without a single shot. It became also the main religion after the fall of the roman empire and following the invasions of Europe from the north. They also dealt with the invasion of Europe from the north and east, and as a result the

Western civilization was born, and the basis for natural and social sciences were established, as well as modern democracy, based on the principle of equality and justice for all humans. The results are then at hand: It is not by chance that a very small sect of the Jewish religion, the followers of Jesus of Nazareth, has become the biggest religion in the world.

The reasons have to do with the motivation: it is not only a reward in the afterlife that true Christians seek. Also happiness in this world, as testified by many saints, from doing what they think is good: bring the miracles of good health to the sick (mental, or spiritual or bodily), justice for the unfairly treated, peace and harmony. On the other hand, the doctrine of justice and equality for all, independently of race, sex, national origin, social condition, age, health, has given them a lot of popularity. In particular with the underprivileged throughout all nations and centuries after Christ. Those motivations are lacking in Muslims, for example, or in simply patriots related to a given nation, much less in profit and/or motivated organizations. The discrimination against women and gays, for example, make Muslims unpopular. The inefficiencies and lack of freedom make communists unpopular. The monopolistic power and information slavery of the big capitalistic corporations make them unpopular. The base of support of Christians, in their fight, makes them be more fierce, overall, at the hour of a battle of defense of their people and their principles.

An important clarification is required. Many Christians are only so in name, and do not have combat morals as the ones described. In fact, many of them helped the wrong illustration, during and after the French revolution, the liberal imperialism which contributed to the current demise of the western civilization, taking the power out of the citizens and justifying slavery, colonialism, racism, human exploitation, and lack of justice for all. They justified materialism and rationalism, taking out the spiritual realm of reality from the economic, political and social aspects of reality. The lack of leadership from Christians often allowed the communists to fill the void left from them in the face of many injustices that the liberal revolution brought against workers and the underprivileged from its origins. As a result, an actual alliance between communism and corporate capitalism has led to the situation we have at hand. That implicit alliance is now explicit, with the Deep State, as we talk about in the companion essay.

But facing these apocalyptic times, we can clearly see a revival of the original Christian spirit. That will make a difference in this new gen war, no doubt about it. As in the case of David vs Goliath, the spiritual motivation, and also the truth behind their concepts about life (true democracy), make the difference. And we are talking about the son of David here and the new Israel. Jesus and his church, that calls for all of

humanity. The Deep State, on the other hand, does not have that kind of moral motivations, except on the Muslim component (the presence of Iran in that alliance is clear) and the Masonry component (which is very weak spiritually because of its religious syncretism and its use for political and economic power of the elites in each country and town and in the world). The main motivations are political and economic power, including the use of religion for that purpose, which is the case of fundamental Islam and of Masonry too.

Now, many people, including an increasing number of democrats in the US, think that the Deep State will not be able to solve human problems in these apocalyptic times associated with a pandemic related to rentism, not at the world level: the new variation of the Venezuelan virus: the curse of abundance. On the contrary. In fact, their leadership has led us to this, as we see in our companion essay and we hinted about in the introduction.

If many US citizens get in a warlike mood for their nation, realizing the key importance of the current battle, the morals of combat might change the relative forces at play, and that would determine that  $x > 0 > y$ . Even though we see many people discouraged by the war against their demands for the revision of the electoral results in 2020, we also see a revival of the spirit of fight from US patriots, both republicans and an increasing number of democrats. More and more patriots are getting fired up, as I see it. And they can make the difference, in a fight of the David vs Goliath confrontation.

Even though the final result is not yet clear, the Trump camp is clearly playing the courage strategy, at least at the political and judiciary fields, which is at odds with a Nash equilibrium that indicates that Biden has more relative force. The reason is because the Biden camp is attacking the leaders of the Trump camp. For example canceling them from their jobs, doing campaigns of defamation, boycotting their companies, harassing them in the legal field, making them believe that they do not have the right to free speech, etc. In this last aspect, the allowance by a court of the demand for defamation of Dominion against Sidney Powell and Michael Lindell is an important precedent, since, as I demonstrate in the companion essay, citizens have the right (and the duty) to criticize their public officials and institutions, including private firms doing public works, making the assumption, even without proof, that they are corrupt. In all, you can say that the contenders are in the path of collision with their cars, each displaying their force and making the contender believe that they are playing the courage, the hawk strategy, so as to make him withdraw and concede.

In the military field, the Trump camp is playing “concede”, at least for the moment, that might also be conceived as a tactical cohabitation strategy. As time goes on, the legal battle might give way to the military one, even though the main field in this war is the communications, political and legal war, and the patriots are active in all of those fields too, in particular by talking to many democrats they think were fooled. And they are fighting the fight in most of the counties, states and preparing for the Supreme Court battle. A military battle, that would imply civil war, might not be needed.

Last but not least. The hand of God is also going to play a role, as we Christians believe. From Kurt Gödel we know that the actual reality that can not be explained by rational arguments is infinitely bigger in many infinity ways than in the ones that can. In particular, there are many miracles documented by reputed scientists throughout history. A miracle is declared as such when a scientist declares there is no scientific explanation for it. That reality which escapes rationality has to do with the spiritual realm or reality. Much bigger than the material and rational one. In that realm God acts. We have given scientific explanations of what might happen here. But miracles can also occur, in the same direction of events. This is a fight between good and evil. An apocalyptic one, most of us would agree. If God exists, and humans alone can not solve this, it is logically reasonable that his hand would help that  $x > 0 > y$ , and the people would win this confrontation against the crooks of the world, and also of hell. We Christians are all praying for this.

## Appendix: Formal definition of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.

For the moment, you can see an introduction here:

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Signaling\\_game](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Signaling_game)